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CONTROLLING THE POUCE: THE JUDGE'S 
ROLE IN MAKING AND REVIEWING LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS 
Wayne R. LaFave* and Frank ]. Remington** 
IN the administration of criminal justice, the judiciary currently carries an important responsibility for the fair, effective, and effi-
cient operation of the system. "Plainly, there is no stage of that 
administration about which judges may say it is not their concem."1 
Moreover, as Mr. Justice Brennan recently observed, "the judicial 
supervisory role, like other aspects of legal regulation, is changing, 
and the trend certainly is one toward enlargement."2 Because this 
is so, it is becoming increasingly important to understand the re-
lationship between the judge and the police in the development 
and implementation of law enforcement policies and practices. 
Of obvious importance to the process of judicial supervision of 
police practices is the exclusionary rule, which requires the exclusion 
of probative evidence when it has been obtained by the police 
through the use of improper law enforcement methods. In recent 
years the responsibility of the trial judge in applying the exclusion-
ary rule has become considerably broader. Mapp v. Ohio3 held the 
rule applicable to the states, and Wong Sun v. United States4 held 
that exclusion is not limited to physical evidence; Rogers v. Rich-
mond5 made it clear that trustworthy confessions may sometimes be 
excluded because of the methods used to obtain them, and, more 
recently, Escobedo v. Illinois6 established denial of counsel as an-
other basis for suppression of evidence. 
Other recent developments, such as Aguilar v. Texas,1 give new 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois.-Ed . 
.. Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.-Ed. 
I. Brennan, Judicial Supervision of Criminal Law Administration, 9 CRIME &: 
DELINQUENCY 227, 233 (1963). 
2. Ibid. 
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
4. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
5. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
7. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Aguilar, the Court held the exclusionary rule appli-
cable to evidence (narcotics) obtained upon the execution of a search warrant 
which was issued by a justice of the peace and which was based upon an affidavit 
submitted by police officers. The affidavit read, in relevant part: "'Affiants have re-
ceived reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, 
marijuana, barbiturates, and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being 
kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to 
the provisions of the law.' " Id. at 109. The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice 
[987] 
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emphasis to the view that it is desirable for judges, in the first in-
stance, to decide whether an arrest or a search shall be made. Such 
decisions, it has been asserted, should be made by a neutral and 
detached magistrate rather than by the police, who are engaged in 
the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."8 There is also 
continuing emphasis upon the desirability of bringing a person 
before the magistrate promptly after arrest in order to enable the 
judicial officer to decide whether there was probable cause for the 
arrest and detention. 
The trend thus seems to be toward according the judiciary an 
even greater role in both the making and the review of important 
law enforcement decisions. The objective, of course, is greater fair-
ness in law enforcement policy and practice. Unfortunately, however, 
as revealed by observation of current practice, judicial participa-
tion is often perfunctory and often has a destructive rather than a con-
structive impact upon law enforcement practice. This is not to say, 
as some have contended, that judges are responsible for the crime 
rate or that "courts have no right to police the police" when they 
should be "getting their own houses in order."9 Rather, the basic 
point is that the increasing involvement of judges in law enforce-
ment makes it imperative that more attention be given to the utility 
of judicial participation as a means of achieving law enforcement 
policies and practices which are both effective and consistent with 
democratic values. 
We have chosen to focus here upon judicial involvement (I) in 
determining whether arrest and search warrants should issue and 
(2) in reviewing such decisions after they have been executed (and, 
perhaps, made) by police officials. A comparison of some recent 
findings respecting the actual practice at the trial level with the 
"ideal" as set forth in appellate opinions may allow some conclu-
sions to be drawn both as to the present effectiveness of appellate 
Goldberg, stated: "[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying 
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he 
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the 
officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, •.• was 
'credible' or his information 'reliable.' Otherwise, 'the inferences from the facts 
which led to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a neutral and detached 
magistrate,' as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged 
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,' • . • or, as in this case, 
by an unidentified informant." Id. at 114-15. 
8. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
9. Inbau, The Social and Ethical Requirements of Criminal Prosecution, 52 J. 
CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 209, 212 (1961). 
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rulings on these subjects and as to the ultimate feasibility of further 
implementation of those rulings. Finally, since the exclusionary rule 
is, theoretically at least, one of the strongest arms of judicial control 
over police practice, it is proper that it be re-examined and its 
practical deficiencies set forth. 
I. JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
DECISIONS 
A. The Assumption 
It is frequently assumed, especially by appellate courts, that it 
is desirable for law enforcement decisions, such as the decision to 
arrest, to be made by judicial officers. Thus, "when the right of 
privacy must reasonably r.ield to the right of search is, as a rule, to 
be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government 
enforcement agent."10 Even in the face of "facts unquestionably 
showing probable cause,"11 a search by an officer may violate the 
Constitution if a magistrate's concurrence in the decision to search 
is not first obtained. 
Under current law, however, there are exceptions. An example 
is the case of a search incident to a lawful arrest, even when there 
is time to obtain a warrant prior to the search.12 Some mem-
bers of the Supreme Court13 and some commentators14 have 
been highly critical of this exception, and it has recently been sug-
gested that the Court may be ready to return to the position that a 
search of premises incident to arrest may be undertaken only if the 
circumstances do not allow a warrant to be obtained prior to the 
search.15 
There has been less emphasis upon the desirability of obtaining 
an arrest warrant prior to arrest than upon the desirability of ob-
IO. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
II. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). 
12. This is the impact of the Supreme Court's overruling of Trupiano v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
13. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented in Rabinowitz, and Justice 
Douglas, who took no part in the case, has elsewhere suggested his disapproval. 
Douglas, The Means and the End, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 103, llO. 
14. E.g., Breeder, Wong Sun v. United States-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. 
L. REv. 483, 496-501 (1963); Kaplan, Search and Seizure-A No-Man's Land in the 
Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474, 489-93 (1961); Comment, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 
664, 678-92 (1961). 
15. Broeder, supra note 14, at 496-98. Broeder bases this view upon: (1) a reading 
of Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), as possibly overruling Rabinowitz; 
(2) the Court's granting certiorari on the question in 1960; and (3) a footnote 
reference in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 n.8 (1963), to the effect that 
the discussion therein "implies no view" on the matter. 
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taining a search warrant prior to conducting a search. An arrest 
without warrant is generally allowed when there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the suspect has committed a felony, regard-
less of whether there is time first to obtain a warrant.16 Further, 
although an arrest warrant is typically required for misdemeanors 
committed out of the presence of the arresting officer,17 an increas-
ing number of states are abandoning this position.18 However, the 
Supreme Court recently has indicated a clear preference for arrests 
made with a warrant19 and has suggested that the standards "are 
more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent."20 This position has 
also been taken by some federal circuit courts,21 and one commenta-
tor recently expressed the view that it is "imperative" that the 
fourth amendment be read as requiring a warrant for arrest except 
in limited instances where the exigencies of the situation do not 
allow taking this step in advance of arrest.22 
The judicial officer is to be preferred over the police officer, the 
Supreme Court has said, because resort to the warrant process 
"interposes an orderly procedure"23 involving "judicial imparti-
ality"24 whereby "a neutral and detached magistrate"25 can make 
"informed and deliberate determinations"26 on the issue of probable 
cause. To leave such decisions to the police is to allow "hurried 
actions"27 by those "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime."28 The exclusionary rule is not sufficient;29 it 
is important that "a disinterested observer should pass on the case 
16. Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning 
and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. 
CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 386, 388 (1960). 
17. Id. at 389. 
18. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2 (1963); WIS. STAT. § 954.03(1) (1963). 
19. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). The ill-fated Trupiano case also contained 
strong dictum to the effect that arrest warrants should be required for all offenses 
except where the crime "plainly occurs before the eyes of an officer." Trupiano v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). 
20. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480 (1963). 
21. Carter v. United States, 314 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1963); Hopper v. United 
States, 267 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1959); Clay v. United States, 239 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 
1956). For a discussion of the rules announced by several courts in an attempt to 
encourage police resort to arrest warrants, see Kaplan, supra note 14, at 499. 
22. Broeder, supra note 14, at 501. 
23. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). 
24. Ibid. 
25. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
26. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, llO (1964) (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)). 
27. Ibid. 
28. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
29. The rule "is calculated to prevent, not to repair." Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
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before a deprivation of personal liberty occurs."30 Moreover, re-
quiring a judicial decision in advance prevents the magistrate from 
being "subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight 
judgment.''31 
The ideal, it has been said, would be for police to seek a warrant 
prior to arrest or search even when not required by law, for "the 
duty of the police in our kind of society requires them to follow 
that legal course which conforms most to democratic values.''32 
B. The Current Practice33 
Judicial participation in law enforcement decisions is not very 
meaningful in practice. The judicial officer is usually not consulted 
30. Foote, Problems of the Protection of Human Rights in Criminal Law and 
Procedure (Santiago, Chile, May 19-30, 1958), U.N. Doc. No. TE 326/1 (40-2) LA, 
at 41-42 (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
31. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). 
32. Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 172 (1953). 
This notion that having the judge actually make the law enforcement decision 
provides greater safeguards for those suspected of crime can be utilized to justify 
other forms of judicial involvement. Unlike the rule on the federal level as set 
forth in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), many states allow a period 
of in-custody investigation after arrest for purposes of gathering additional evidence 
relevant to the charging decision. (For example, on the Michigan and Wisconsin 
position, see Lafave, Detention for Investigation by the Police-An Analysis of 
Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 344-55.) It can be argued that in such a 
system the decision on whether the circumstances justify further investigation 
should not be made by the police, as is the common practice, but should instead 
be made by a magistrate with power to remand the suspect to the police in ap-
propriate cases. Such a remand system has been proposed as an alternative to 
Mallory (Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003 (1959)), and is to be found in a few states 
and a number of foreign countries. (LaFave, supra at 333-34 nn. 20, 21) Similarly, 
it has been argued that judges should be given responsibility for actually conducting 
in-custody interrogations (Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Sus-
pected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 1017 (1934)) and for releasing suspects 
without prosecution because of lack of evidence (Foote, Safeguards in the Law of 
Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 25 (1957)) or because of policy reasons, as with the 
drunk arrested for his own safety. Compare CAL. PEN. CODE § 849 (allowing "any 
peace officer" to make the release), with MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 272, §§ 44-46 (1956) 
(requiring the officer to file a complaint, which the judge may dismiss in certain 
cases). 
33. Much of the empirical data upon which the descriptions of current practices 
are based are derived from the American Bar Foundation's field research in support 
of its Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States, with 
which the authors have been associated for some years. The first published volume 
carrying the final results of the Survey is LAFAVE, Aruu:sr-THE DECISION To TAKE 
A SusPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965). Other volumes in the series soon to be published 
are on the detection of crime, the charging decision, the adjudication decision, and 
the sentencing decision. 
The ABF field studies were conducted in Kansas, Michigan, and Wisconsin and 
focus primarily upon practices in Wichita, Detroit, and Milwaukee. The present 
article is also based upon other observations by the authors in Illinois (primarily 
in Chicago) and Wisconsin. 
No attempt is made herein to identify certain practices with specific localities. 
In part, this is necessary to preserve confidential sources of information. Moreover, 
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in advance, and, when he is, his participation is largely perfunctory. 
Arrest warrants are seldom obtained prior to arrest.84 Even when 
a warrant is obtained, the objective of the police usually is not to 
acquire a judicial evaluation of the grounds for arrest; rather, the 
warrant is sought as a bookkeeping device or to serve some other 
administrative function.85 
In large urban areas particularly, arrest warrants are commonly 
issued without any meaningful participation by a judicial officer. If 
the judge actually signs the warrant, as is almost always required 
by law,36 he is likely to do so without a careful reading of the com-
plaint and without any direct examination of the complainant. This 
task is often performed by the judge while he is engaged in the 
trial of cases or the holding of preliminary examinations. Illustrative 
is the following report: 
"All during the preliminary examinations this morning the 
judge was signing arrest warrants. It was difficult for me to judge 
the number of warrants signed, since this was going on while 
witnesses in the preliminary examinations were being ques-
tioned. I noticed that the clerk would sometimes go to the oppo-
site side of the courtroom, administer the oath to the officer or 
complainant wishing to have the warrant signed, and then, very 
quietly, take the warrant to the bench for the judge's signature. 
This judge was not appreciably bothered by this duty, since he 
merely signed his name to the warrant while listening to the 
testimony of the witnesses in other matters. The clerk, inci-
dentally, administered the oath as quietly as he could so that 
the proceedings would not be disturbed. I would say that, be-
identification is not necessary, as the purpose of this article is not to criticize any 
agency with respect to the most difficult problems it faces but rather to report and 
analyze such practices as do exist in the hope that it will provide a solid basis for 
improvement. It should not be assumed that all of the practices described neces-
sarily prevail in all of the jurisdictions named above. 
34. In many jurisdictions, however, arrest warrants are obtained on those persons 
in police custody who are going to be prosecuted. The warrant issued after arrest 
serves as either a manifestation of the charging decision or a basis for commitment 
of the defendant unable to post bail. 
Even if the law requires a warrant for arrest, as is commonly true of the mis-
demeanor occurring out of the officer's presence, no warrant is sought if some reason 
for immediate apprehension is apparent and there is no critical evidence which would 
be excluded because of the lack of a warrant. On the reasons why the police 
sometimes believe it is impractical to comply with the warrant requirement in 
misdemeanor cases, see LAFAVE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 22-28. 
35. On the various functions served by the warrant, see id. at 36-51. 
36. In most jurisdictions the issuance of arrest warrants is by statute the responsi-
bility of judicial officers. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. § 62-602 (1949). Wisconsin, 
however, has a unique statute allowing a magistrate or the district attorney to sign 
the warrant. WIS. STAT. § 954.01 (1963). And compare the Michigan provision, which 
requires concurrence of the magistrate and prosecutor for most offenses. MICH. COMP. 
LAws §§ 300.12, 774.4 (Supp. 1961); MICH. COMP. LAws § 764.1 (1948). 
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tween the hours of 9:30 and 11:00 a.m., the judge signed ten 
or fifteen warrants."37 
When court is not in session, judges seldom make any greater in-
quiry into the basis for issuing the process.38 In some jurisdictions 
the judge has his clerk sign the warrant and thus does not even see 
the complaint upon which the arrest is to be based. 
As a general proposition, there is greater judicial concern over 
the issuance of search warrants than over the issuance of arrest 
warrants. This is difficult to understand, since at least as many 
searches are conducted incident to arrest warrants as are conducted 
incident to search warrants; in some respects the arrest warrant con-
fers a broader power of search than does the search warrant.39 
Although most judges view the issuance of a search warrant as 
an important responsibility, this is not true in all jurisdictions. 
There is, for example, evidence that some judges issue search war-
rants without giving detailed consideration to whether sufficient: 
grounds exist. Serious consideration of the legality of the search is 
postponed until the issue is raised by a motion to suppress the evi-
dence on the ground that it was illegally obtained. Sometimes when 
the case is tried before the judge who originally issued the warrant 
"he may reverse himself and hold that the grounds upon which he 
himself issued the search warrant were insufficient."40 When this 
occurs with s·ome regularity, it is apparent that the judge does not 
apply the same standards in issuing the warrant as he does when the 
admissibility of the evidence is challenged. 
C. The Causes and Consequences of the Practice 
Because only the fiction of before-the-fact judicial control is 
maintained in practice, the result is often lesser instead of greater 
37. From a report of an American Bar Foundation field researcher. See note 33 
supra. 
38. For example, this incident was reported by a field researcher for the American 
Bar Foundation: "After arriving in court, the police officer went directly to the 
court room of the examining magistrate. The court was not in session, so the 
officer went to a back room adjacent to the judge's chambers where a group of 
men were playing cards. One of them said that the judge was on his way out of 
the building. The officer returned to the hallway and found the judge about to 
board an elevator. They exchanged a brief greeting with the officer extending the 
warrant toward the judge. Without completely unfolding the document, and 
certainly without reading it, the judge signed and returned it without any question. 
The officer thanked him as the latter disappeared into the elevator. It appeared to 
me that the only possible information which the judge could have learned about 
the case from this transaction would be an inference that the defendant was involved 
in a burglary, since the officer was assigned to the holdup and breaking and 
entering bureau." 
39, See Kaplan, supra note 14, at 492-93. 
40. Wilson, How the Police Chief Sees It, Harper's Magazine, April 1964, pp. 140, 
143. 
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protection against unjustified police action than if the warrant 
process were not utilized. When the process-however meaningless 
-is used, police often appear to be less concerned with whether an 
adequate basis for an arrest or search exists than they are when the 
decision to arrest or search is theirs alone. Their assumption (true 
in theory but seldom true in practice) is that the warrant process 
is a judicial responsibility. 
When judges give only perfunctory attention to whether a basis 
for the warrant exists, the warrant process is deprived of the ad-
vantage it would otherwise have from the point of view of the 
police. Since there is no real assurance that the arrest and search 
will be lawful and the evidence admissible, the inducement to seek 
an advance judicial determination in doubtful cases is often lack-
ing. In addition, the inconsistency between the standard applied 
when a warrant is requested prior to arrest or search and the stand-
ard applied when the admissibility of evidence is later challenged 
creates uncertainty in the minds of the police as to what legal norms 
actually govern arrest and search. Furthermore, the spectacle of 
a judge quashing a warrant he or one of his colleagues issued a few 
days earlier creates police doubt as to the ability of judges to "police 
the police." The lack of concern by the local judiciary with pre-
venting unconstitutional arrests and searches, as opposed to exclud-
ing the fruits thereof after the event, contributes to a police view 
that the courts are only interested in freeing the guilty and hamper-
ing law enforcement. 
It is not entirely clear why judges do not participate in a 
more significant way in decisions regarding whether arrest or 
search warrants should issue. In urban areas it may be explainable 
in part by the pressure of other demands on their available time. 
However, this does not appear to be a major factor, since meaning-
ful participation does not occur even in instances where there is 
clearly time for a careful decision by the judge. It seems more accu-
rate to conclude that many judges are reluctant to become truly 
involved in what they conceive to be a relatively ministerial task of 
issuing process. The judge is likely to be more interested in the 
trial of cases and in other matters which seem to him to be clearly 
judges' work. 
One judge, when asked why he did not give more careful atten-
tion to requests for arrest warrants and search warrants, explained, "I 
have complete confidence in the police and prosecutor's office." It 
does seem clear that most judges are willing to rely heavily on the 
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prosecutor and, to a somewhat lesser extent, on the police where 
the prosecutor's advice is not routinely sought. Yet this clearly is 
not a satisfactory explanation, for the practice continues in jurisdic-
tions where judges frequently suppress evidence obtained by search 
incident to a warrant. 
Perhaps the assumption is that the decision to arrest or search 
is the responsibility of the police and prosecutor, with the role of 
the judge being limited to review of the decision if it is later chal-
lenged in an adversary setting. However, since such review occurs 
only when a motion to suppress is presented by the defendant,41 
it is limited to instances in which service of the warrant results in 
finding physical evidence42 critical to the prosecution. 
Whatever the reasons for the practice, the divergence between 
it and the ideal raises doubts about the feasibility of maximum 
judicial participation in the actual making of law enforcement 
decisions. 
II. PROMPT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS 
A. The Assumption 
Mallory v. United States43 held that federal officers must bring 
an arrested person before the nearest available magistrate as soon 
as it is administratively feasible to do so. Because the states have 
not followed the Mallory approach of excluding confessions ob-
tained during unlawful delay,44 the requirements in this respect 
remain unclear in many jurisdictions.45 But, even in states which 
41. It is commonly thought that review of the arrest occurs in all cases through 
prompt appearance of the defendant before a magistrate, but this is not the case. See 
text accompanying notes 43-64 infra. A form of review occurs at the preliminary hearing 
held some days later, but the focus then is not upon whether there were grounds 
for arrest but rather upon whether there presently is "probable cause" to subject 
the defendant to trial. 
42. Although the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963), held that the exclusionary rule applied to verbal evidence obtained by illegal 
arrest, the case appears to have had very limited impact because of the narrow inter-
pretation given it by most courts. 
43. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). This was the Court's interpretation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 
5(a), which requires federal officers to take persons arrested before a commissioner 
"without unnecessary delay.'' 
44. In People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960), Michigan became 
the first state to adopt the Mallory sanction. However, subsequent decisions by the 
court make it doubtful that illegal detention will alone bring about exclusion of 
a confession. See People v. McCager, 367 Mich. 116, 116 N.W.2d 205 (1962); People v. 
Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W .2d 808 (1962). 
45. The state statutes are collected in LaFave, supra note 32, at 332-33. States 
with identical statutory language have placed quite different interpretations upon 
them. For example, the phrase "without unnecessary delay" has been interpreted 
most strictly in New York, and the contention that delay was needed for purpose 
.. 
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· clearly allow some delay for purposes of in-custody investigation,46 
it is generally assumed that reasonably prompt appearance before 
a judicial officer is an important safeguard in the criminal justice 
system.47 
It is often said that prompt appearance before the magistrate 
insures that the validity of the suspect's arrest will receive immediate 
and careful review by a judicial officer. The Supreme Court has 
observed that legislation calling for appearance without d~lay re-
quires "that the police must with reasonable promptness show 
legal cause for detaining arrested persons."48 In Mallory, the Court 
asserted that an arrested person should be brought "before a judicial 
officer as quickly as possible . . . so that the issue of probable 
cause may be promptly determined."49 Commentators have often 
asserted that, when the case cannot be immediately tried, the magis-
trate's duty is to inquire into the evidence and to release the suspect 
if the evidence is found to be lacking. 50 In current practice, however, 
of investigation has been said to be "no excuse under the statute." People v. Snyder, 
297 N.Y. 81, 92, 74 N.E.2d 657, 662 (1947); see also People v. Kelly, 8 App. Div. 
2d 478, 188 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1959); People v. Trinchillo, 2 App. Div. 2d 146, 153 
N.Y.S.2d 685 (1956); Bass v. State, 196 Misc. 177, 92 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Ct. Cl. 1949). Yet, 
in interpreting the same words, other courts have approved detentions where "the 
officers in good faith were energetically endeavoring to discover the true facts" 
(Mooradian v. Davis, 302 Mich. 484, 489, 5 N.W.2d 435, 437 (1942)), or where "the 
crime committed has not been fully solved" (People v. Kelly, 404 Ill. 281, 289, 89 
N.E.2d 27, 29 (1949)). -States without statutes are in similar disagreement. Compare 
State v. Beebe, 13 Kan. 589 (1874), with Peloquin v. Hibner, 231 Wis. 11: 285 N.W. 
380 (1939). 
46. For example, Michigan and Wisconsin. See LaFave, supra note 32, at 346-53. 
47. Putting aside the assumption that prompt appearance insures immediate 
review of the grounds for the arrest, the prompt appearance requirement can 
operate to the benefit of the suspect in other ways. If in-custody investigation is not 
allowed or is kept within reasonable limits, there will be little chance for coercion 
of a confession or other improper investigative techniques. Appearance in court 
gives visibility to the suspect's arrest, makes it possible for him to learn of the 
charge against him, and allows him to make contact with counsel and friends. 
Moreover, if the suspect is brought before a magistrate without delay he will at 
least have the opportunity to obtain his release on bail. 
Of course, it has been argued that too strict a requirement can operate to the 
suspect's disadvantage in that public charging will occur without the suspect first 
having an opportunity to be cleared by the police. See Goldsmith v. United States, 
277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
48. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943). 
49. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957). 
50. Illustrative are the following: 
"A defendant will be discharged by the examining magistrate unless the 
police have immediately available enough evidence, if uncontradicted, to 
prove his guilt. . • . If he [a police officer] brought the defendant before a 
magistrate without the proper evidence the defendant would immediately be 
released." ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 39 (1947). 
"We come now to the last of the magistrate's functions, his final contact 
with the criminal case-the setting of bail. In its nature this function . • • 
presupposes that, the preliminary examination having been held, he has 
decided that there is sufficient (i.e., 'probable') cause to bind the accused over 
to the grand jury." PUTIKAMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 98 (1953). 
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at least in many jurisdictions, the initial appearance before a judicial 
officer does not include a judicial inquiry into whether there were 
grounds for the arrest or are grounds for requiring that the suspect 
post bail as a condition of his release. 
Some of the mistaken impressions as to what occurs at this first 
appearance are undoubtedly attributable to the confusing terminol-
ogy often used to describe this step. It is sometimes referred to as 
an arraignment,111 which tends to confuse it with a step which comes 
substantially later in the process and at which the felony defendant 
is called upon to plead. More frequently, it is referred to as the 
preliminary hearing,112 which is a hearing before a judicial officer 
at which the prosecutor calls witnesses for the purpose of establish-
ing probable cause and obtaining a bindover to the grand jury or to 
trial where the grand jury system has been abolished. The actual 
practice in many jurisdictions, however, is for the magistrate at the 
"At this appearance-popularly but in most states erroneously called arraign-
ment-the first duty of the magistrate is to inquire into the arrest and see that 
the subject is properly charged with the commission of a specific criminal offense. 
• • • If the arrest was without a warrant, one must be issued. A complaint 
must be signed ••• to support the warrant." HouTS, FROM ARREsr TO RELEAsE 83 
(1958). 
"Today the person arrested in advance of the filing of a formal accusation 
against him is brought before a magistrate for the sole purpose of ascertaining 
whether the authorities can present enough evidence against him to warrant 
his being continued in custody (or in bail) pending further action by the 
authorities looking either to the lodging of a formal accusation against him or 
to his release." MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 32 (rev. ed. 1964). 
"In most countries the law requires that shortly after arrest, the person 
arrested should be brought before a judicial or other competent authority who 
will pass upon the propriety of the arrest and determine whether he should 
be kept in custody or released. This requirement of a post-arrest check affords 
the arrested person ipso jure a prompt opportunity to have the legality of, as 
well as the necessity for, his arrest determined by an independent authority." 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Study of the Right of Everyone 
To Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile, U.N. Doc. No. 
E/CN.4/813, p. 59 (1961). 
"You cannot arrest a man without a warrant unless you have reasonable 
grounds for making the arrest. Therefore, the law fits logically-that when you 
have no warrant and yet arrest a man, it is up to you to bring him immediately 
before a magistrate to show you have reasonable grounds for arrest." Statement 
of Attorney General Francis Biddle in Hearings on R.R. 3690 Before the Sub-
committee on the Study of the Admission of Evidence of the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1943), quoted in statement by 
Professor Yale Kamisar in Confessions and Police Detention, Hearings on 
S. Res. 234 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 767 (1958). 
51. As is the case in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957). This 
slip of the pen is apparently the reason why, in congressional hearings in response 
to Mallory, the state statutes dealing with arraignment, as opposed to those on 
initial appearance, are collected. See Exhibit 31 in Confessions and Police Detention, 
Hearings on S. Res. 234, supra note 50. 
52. See Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 338 n.2a (D.C. Cir. 1960), where 
the court asserts that this stage of the process should not be called an arraignment 
but instead a preliminary hearing. Yet FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, to which the court refers, 
merely calls it an "appearance before the commissioner," at which time the 
commissioner is to "inform the defendant • • • of his right to have a preliminary 
examination," which is to be held "within a reasonable time." 
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initial appearance merely to notify the defendant of the charge, 
set bail, and ask him whether he wants a preliminary hearing.53 If 
the defendant answers in the affirmative,54 this hearing is scheduled 
for a week or ten days later, for it is only then that the prosecution 
and defense will be prepared.55 The preliminary hearing, coming 
53. By contrast, it is commonly assumed that unless the preliminary examination 
was already held and propable cause found, the accused would not be required to 
post bail in order to obtain his release. See, e.g., PuTrKAMER, op. cit. supra note 50, 
at 98. 
54. However, most defendants waive the preliminary examination. See Miller &: 
Dawson, Non-Use of the Preliminary Examination-A Study of Current Practices, 
1964 WIS. L. REv. 252. 
55. This delay in holding the preliminary examination has been observed in 
some locales in Kansas, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In Michigan, the statutes 
require the preliminary hearing to be held within ten days of the initial appearance 
(MICH. COMP. LAws § 766.4 (1948)), while in Wisconsin the statute provides for the 
preliminary hearing to be held within ten days unless the defendant consents to a 
longer period (WIS. STAT. § 954.05 (1963)). The Kansas statutes are silent on the matter 
of delay of the preliminary hearing, and the new Illinois code simply declares that the 
judge before whom a person is brought following arrest shall "Hold a preliminary 
hearing in those cases where the judge is without jurisdiction to try the offense." 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-l(b)(3) (1963). 
Although no attempt has been made to uncover all of the statutes in point, the 
situation country-wide would appear to break down as follows: 
(1) In some states, the statutes appear to call for a very prompt preliminary 
hearing after arrest, although there is provision for continuance of the hearing 
upon a showing of "good cause." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-608 (1964) (not more than 
three days at a time "for the purpose of procuring the attendance of witnesses • • • 
or other sufficient reason'); CAL. PEN. CODE § 860 (not more than two days at a 
time, not more than six days in all); FLA. STAT. § 902.05 (1963) (also two and six days, 
respectively); IDAHO CoDE § 19-804 (1948) (also two and six days, respectively); IowA 
CODE § 761.4 (1950) (not more than thirty days); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-501 (1956) 
(where "necessary for any just cause"; no stated time limit); NEV. REv. STAT. § 
171.390 (1963) (not more than two days at a time, not more than six days in all); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 596:1 (1955) ("as should be judged reasonable"; no time 
limit); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-4 (1953); N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. § 191 (not more 
than two days at a time); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-07 (1960) (not more than three 
days at a time; not more than fifteen days in all); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2937.02 
(1954) (not to exceed ten days, and "absence of counsel or material witnesses is 
reasonable cause for continuance'); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 254 (1937); ORE. REv. STAT. 
§ 133.640 (1963) (not more than one day at a time, not more than six days in all); 
S.D. CODE § 34.1402 (Supp. 1960) (two and six days respectively); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
40-1104 (1955) (not more than three days at a time); UTAH CODE ANN, § 77-15-5 
(1953) (not more than one day at a time; not more than twelve days in all); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-167 (1959) ("until the cause of delay be removed and no longer'). 
(2) In some states the statutes are similar to those in Michigan and Wisconsin, 
in that they merely set an outer limit on delay. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 129 (1958) (ten 
days); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 147, § 10 (1954) (not more than ten days delay at 
a time); MINN. STAT. § 629.47 (1947) (same); MONT. REV. CoDE ANN. § 94-6104 
(1947) (same); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-10-9 (1956) (not more than fourteen days at 
any one time); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-102 (1960) (not more than ten days at a time); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.16.040 (1956) (ten days in all). 
(3) In some states the statutes simply require that the magistrate hear the 
evidence "within a reasonable time" or that he may delay for certain purposes. DEL. 
RULES OF CRIM PROC., Superior Court, Rule 5(c) ("within a reasonable time'); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 27-403 (1953) ("A reasonable time shall be given to the defendant or 
prosecutor for the preparation of his case'); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 246 (1954) 
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as it does some time after the arrest and initial' appearance, is not so 
much a check upon the police decision to arrest as it is a check upon 
the prosecutor's decision to go to trial. 
Some states by statute require police who have arrested a person 
without a warrant to take him before a magistrate and submit evi-
dence to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant.56 I£ the warrant is 
issued it becomes the basis for continuing custody or requiring bail 
for release. More common is legislation which merely requires that 
a complaint be filed with the magistrate, 57 leaving somewhat uncer-
tain the magistrate's control function in such circumstances. In at 
least some of these jurisdictions, however, the practice is to obtain 
both a complaint and a warrant at or before the time the defendant 
is first brought before a judicial oflicer.58 
("magistrate may at the request of either party postpone the examination to procure 
testimony''). The requirement on the federal level is simply that "the commissioner 
shall hear the evidence within a reasonable time," FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c), and, while 
it is clear that the hearing is not always held at the time the defendant is initially 
brought into court (e.g., Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960)), it 
is not known how common this is in practice. One court held that a continuance of 
twenty days to allow the government to secure witnesses was not a denial of a 
preliminary hearing within a reasonable time. James v. Lawrence, 176 F.2d 18 
(D.C. Cir. 1949). 
(4) In some states the only reason for delay mentioned is defendant's need to 
secure counsel. KY. CRIM. RULES 3.08 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-87 (1953). 
56. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 15:70 (1951) (a statute concerning the duties of officers 
arresting without warrant, making reference to the "return of the officer making the 
arrest, indorsed upon the warrant upon which the accused person shall be subse-
quently held''); Mo. REv. STAT. § 544.170 (1959) (contemplates that those held 
"shall be charged with a criminal offense by the oath of some credible person, and 
be held by warrant to answer to such offense''); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-46 (1953) (persons 
arrested without warrant to be taken to a magistrate, "who, on proper proof, shall 
issue a warrant''); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-155 (1959) (on arrest without warrant "until 
a legal warrant can be obtained''). 
57. E.g., CAL. PEN. CoDE § 849 (if arrest without warrant, person to be taken 
before magistrate and "a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person, 
must be laid before such magistrate''); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:22 (1955) (where 
arrest without warrant, defendant to be taken to court so "that a complaint may 
be made for the offense''); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.05 (1954) (to go to 
magistrate for "a complaint stating the offense for which the person was arrested''). 
58. As to the practice in Kansas, Michigan, and Wisconsin, it has been said: 
"Despite the fact that most arrests are accomplished without a warrant, in 
practice the warrant is invariably issued if a subsequent decision is made to 
prosecute the suspect. Since the warrant is primarily conceived in formal law 
as an arrest-authorizing document, the reason for the practice is not immediately 
apparent. In some jurisdictions offenses triable by a justice of the peace may 
be tried, and a preliminary examination of serious offenses may be held, on a 
complaint alone, and there would appear to be no insurmountable reason 
why this could not be done everywhere. 
"In the states under intensive consideration here, some officials charged with 
the responsibility for administering the criminal law believe that the formal 
law requires that a warrant be issued even after an arrest without one. Others 
are simply uncertain. Of those who believe that a warrant is required, some do 
not know the reason; others give reasons ranging from statutory necessity to 
custom, including, in some instances, justification of custody. Yet all of them 
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B. The Current Practice 
In practice, the extent of real judicial participation when the 
warrant is issued after arrest is certainly no greater than it is when 
the warrant is issued prior to arrest. The process is routine and 
does not involve judicial inquiry into whether a basis for the 
warrant exists. The assumption apparently is that the warrant 
serves either as a manifestation of the charging decision or as an 
official record supporting custody by a law enforcement agency and 
that, in either case, no inquiry into the supporting facts is required. 
The warrant issued after arrest is most often utilized as a 
record of the prosecutor's decision to charge the arrested person 
with a crime. After arrest of a person for a relatively serious offense, 
the usual practice is for the police to consult with the prosecutor 
in order for the latter to decide whether to proceed with the case. 
If the prosecutor believes that the evidence is sufficient to support 
a prosecution and that there are no policy reasons dictating a con-
trary course, he will authorize the preparation of a complaint and 
warrant. These documents are then taken to court, either during or 
before the initial appearance of the person named in the warrant, 
and the judge or his clerk routinely signs the arrest warrant.159 Be-
cause in this kind of case the warrant is a charging document and 
because the prosecutor in this country has always dominated the de-
cision to bring charges, 60 perhaps it was "inevitable"61 that the pro-
secutor and not the magistrate should actually decide when the 
warrant should be issued.62 
recognize that whatever the necessity in formal law, in practice the warrant is 
regarded as the charging document." 
Miller &: Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision-A Study of Cur-
rent Practices, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2-3. 
59. For a more complete description of the practice in Kansas, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin, see Miller &: Tiffany, supra note 58, at 4-7. 
60. Id. at 7-8, and many sources cited therein. 
61. Id. at 9. 
62. It may be that in practice the prosecutor gives greater protection to the 
suspect than would the magistrate if he were the decision-maker, for the prosecutor 
will be concerned with matters above and beyond the existence of probable cause. 
For one thing, he will be exercising what is commonly referred to as the "prosecutor's 
discretion," and thus will eliminate on policy grounds some cases in which the 
evidence is sufficient. For another, the prosecutor will likely require more evidence 
than would otherwise be necessary for issuance of a warrant, for ordinarily he will 
not want to bring a case to trial unless there is a strong probability of conviction. 
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the notion of prompt judicial review 
of police action is clearly a fiction under these circumstances. Because of the almost 
complete lack of attention to -the issuance of warrants after arrest, it is difficult 
to say whether the constitutional requirement that the matter be passed upon by a 
judicial officer, as expressed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), has any 
application here. 
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In some places, warrants are issued promptly after arrest without 
involving the prosecutor and without any significant decision by a 
judicial officer. This occurs when the custody of an arrested person is 
to be transferred from one law enforcement agency to another. He is 
brought before a judicial officer prior to the charging decision in 
order to enable the magistrate to effect the transfer. Thus, where 
city police turn persons arrested for state offenses over to county au-
thorities for "housing" prior to trial, a suspect may be taken before a 
magistrate immediately for preparation of a complaint and warrant, 
documents which are thought to justify an assumption of custody by 
the county authorities. The magistrates have come to view this as 
merely a clerical task and consequently do not make any inquiry into 
the existence of probable cause. 
The fact that the warrant issued after arrest serves functions 
other than judicial review of the arrest decision points up the rele-
vance of a statement made by Alfred Bettman over thirty years ago. 
Commenting in the Wickersham Report on the inadequacies of 
earlier crime surveys, he said that they had failed to answer one basic 
question about the warrant process: "Should the clerk of court be 
the official in whom this function is placed, and using clerical 
methods, or the prosecuting attorney using methods appropriate to 
his office, or the magistrate using methods of a judicial nature?"63 
Today, the appearance of judicial control is maintained, while in 
fact only prosecutorial or clerical functions are performed. 
Some judges may not give the arrest decision any greater scrutiny 
if the case is brought to them on habeas corpus. At least this is true 
in one jurisdiction where the writ of habeas corpus is commonly uti-
lized by those in police custody. The writ challenges the validity of 
the present detention rather than the original arrest, but often hear-
ings are scheduled promptly after arrest, when there is not likely to be 
any evidence other than that available to the arresting officer. In 
such a situation the detention might be challenged on the ground 
that the arrest was illegal. In practice, however, the judge makes no 
inquiry into the grounds for arrest; instead, he merely sets a time by 
which the police must either charge or release the suspect.64 One 
63. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report No. 4, 
Prosecution, 1931, at 88. 
64. This is accomplished by adjourning or continuing the habeas corpus hearing 
for the amount of time allowed. If at the expiration of the time the suspect was 
not charged, the judge would then order his release. It is unclear whether this 
practice, observed in certain locales in Michigan, still prevails in view of recent 
developments there. See People v. McCager, 367 Mich. 116, 116 N.W.2d 205 (1962), 
and "Order of Superintending Control-Habeas Corpus Proceedings,'' dated March 
7, 1963, in Mich. S.B.J., April 1963, p. 56. 
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judge, when asked why an inquiry into the grounds for arrest was 
not made, responded only by saying that there should be time for 
investigation. Defense attorneys, when asked why they did not 
challenge the arrest in some cases, said that they felt this would be 
inappropriate and that the judges would not listen to such an argu-
ment. Thus, even in an adversary setting there is judicial reluctance 
to consider the legality of the initial law enforcement decision, and 
the arrested person's remedy is limited to a promise of release if a 
decision to charge is not made within a short period of time. 
Ill. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE AS A MEANS OF JUDICIAL CONTROL 
A. Objective of the Exclusionary Rule 
From Weeks v. United States65 in 1914 until Mapp v. Ohio66 
nearly fifty years later, the exclusionary rule has been a matter of 
vigorous debate. 67 The criticism that "the criminal is to go free be-
cause the constable has blundered"68 has not prevailed, and the 
Court in Mapp, finding that the other means of protecting against 
unreasonable searches were ineffective,69 imposed the exclusionary 
doctrine on the states. 
Courts and commentators have explained the raison d'etre of the 
exclusionary rule in various ways. It is sometimes said that the objec-
tive is that of "preserving the judicial process from contamination"70 
or of insuring that the government does not profit from its own 
wrongdoing;71 sometimes the rule is characterized in terms of the 
defendant's "privilege against conviction by unlawfully obtained 
evidence."72 However, it is fair to conclude that the principal reason 
65. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
66. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
67. Probably the last pre-Mapp debate was The Exclusionary Rule Regarding 
Illegally Seized Evidence-An International Symposium, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 245 
(1961). A number of references are to be found -therein to earlier written views 
both pro and con. 
68. This, of course, is the now famous comment of Judge Cardozo in People v. 
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
69. In Mapp, the Supreme Court emphasized the findings in California, expressed 
in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), to the effect that other 
remedies were inadequate, and then said: "The experience of California that such 
other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of 
other States. The obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the 
protection of other remedies has, moreover, been recognized by this Court since 
Wolf." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961). 
70. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
See also Frankel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 
33 IOWA L. R.Ev. 472, 498 (1948). 
71. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment-A Requiem for Wolf, in 
SUPREME CouRT REvmw 1, 34 (Kurland ed. 1961). 
72. Allen, supra note 71, at 35. 
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for the exclusion of probative evidence is to deter improper police 
practices. The Court in Mapp emphasized the need for the exclu-
sionary rule as a "deterrent safeguard,"73 and on an earlier occasion 
stated that the rule "is calculated to prevent, not to repair."74 It is 
intended to be a complement to judicial participation in the making 
of law enforcement decisions and to judicial review of such decisions 
after the fact. 
Thus it is not surprising that thoughtful commentators have 
said that "the ultimate test of the exclusionary rules is whether they 
deter police officials from engaging in the objectionable practices."75 
However, despite the existence of the exclusionary rule on the 
federal level for over half a century and in many states for almost as 
long, there has been no systematic attempt to measure its precise im-
pact or to determine the limitations, if any, upon its effectiveness.76 
The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule depends upon: (1) 
whether the requirements of law are developed in sufficient detail 
and in a manner responsive to both the practical needs of enforce-
ment and the individual right of privacy; (2) whether these require-
ments are expressed in a manner understandable by the front-line 
police officer and are effectively communicated to him; and (3) 
whether the desire of the police to obtain convictions is sufficiently 
great to induce compliance with the requirements of law. Although 
sufficient data is not available to allow any precise measurement of the 
actual impact of the exclusionary rule, it is fair to conclude from ex-
amination of current practices that none of these three essentials 
have been adequately achieved. 
B. Inadequate Communication Between Trial 
Courts. and the Police 
Hearings on motions to suppress evidence allegedly obtained 
by illegal police investigative practices are often conducted in a 
73. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). 
74. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
75. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedure-Another Look, 48 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 16, 34 (1953). See also Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties-
Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 171, 179 (1962). 
76. Much of the pre-Mapp debate was addressed to the question of whether the 
police are in fact deterred. For citation to many of these sources, see Allen, supra 
note 71, at 33 n.174; Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later-Illegal State Evi-
dence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1146 n.227 (1959). However, 
it has been said that this writing "is more remarkable for its volume than its cogency." 
Allen, supra note 71, at 33. The obvious difficulty is that adequate empirical evidence 
to justify the conclusion either that the police are deterred or that they are not 
deterred has been unavailable. Moreover, it is not easy "to devise methods to produce 
a persuasive empirical demonstration." Id. at 34. 
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manner not calculated to encourage careful consideration of the 
factual and legal bases for the motion. Moreover, when a decision is 
made by the •trial judge, he seldom explains it in a manner likely to 
have an impact upon the particular police practice that is in issue. 
This is particularly true in the large urban centers and is to a lesser 
extent the case in rural areas or smaller cities. 
Defense counsel often present the motion to suppress orally and 
without articulating any specific ground upon which it should be 
granted. The police officer is immediately sworn and cross-examined 
by defense counsel, who, even without preparation, is in many cases 
able to cast doubt upon the propriety of the police conduct.77 The 
assistant prosecutor assigned to the courtroom frequently has had no 
opportunity for advance preparation or even consultation with the 
officer78 and may, therefore, not be able to draw from the officer an 
adequate presentation of the law enforcement practice involved in 
the particular case. 79 
As a consequence, trial courts rarely are given an accurate or 
complete picture of the law enforcement practice challenged by the 
motion to suppress. Seldom does the trial judge himself initiate 
inquiry to determine what the current policy and practice is with 
respect to arrest, search, the use of informants, or whatever else may 
be in issue. No such inquiry is made of the police officer involved in 
the case, and, even if he were asked, he probably would not be cap-
able of giving a comprehensive answer. Yet the hypothesis underlying 
77. Defense counsel's questions are usually intended to establish that the evidence 
was uncovered by a search not preceded by conclusive knowledge by the officer of 
defendant's violation. This is ordinarily the same thing as establishing that the items 
were uncovered by search, since the violation in question is usually possession of the 
items sought to be suppressed. 
78. Thus, during the defense counsel's examination of the police officer, the 
prosecutor is likely to be frantically examining the officer's written report of the 
case for the purpose of getting clear in his own mind the circumstances leading up 
to -the arrest and search. However, this report, prepared primarily for other purposes, 
is not likely to be very revealing in this regard even if carefully written, which is 
the exception rather than the rule. 
79. By way of illustration, the arrest of a "bagman" (a courier for a policy or 
numbers operation) which resulted in the finding of a package of_ bet slips on his per-
son might in point of fact be based upon the following information: that he has a pre-
vious record as a bagman; that he has been observed for some days traveling a regular 
route in an area of the city where policy is a popular pastime; that he is making 
stops at a number of locations, some of which have been identified in the past as 
"policy stations"; that he made these stops during a time of day when policy slips are 
usually picked up; and, perhaps, that he is carrying a package with something in it. 
Defense counsel's examination of the officer will establish that the officer did not 
actually see the gambling paraphernalia until after the arrest, and the prosecution's 
attempt at rehabilitation may produce only the vague assertion by the officer that 
the defendant was a "known policy employee" (which may be the only information 
recorded on the arrest report). 
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the exclusionary rule is that it will have a prospective and positive 
effect upon police practice. 
It is also unlikely that the large-city trial judge will receive help-
ful argument on the relevant law. As a rule, neither prosecution nor 
defense are sufficiently prepared to present an adequate argument 
based upon prior appellate decisions. The consequence is that some 
trial courts apply to current police practice a standard quite at vari-
ance with that which has been announced by the appellate court.80 
Nor are police well informed about the trial judge's decision or 
its legal basis. The trial judge seldom explains his decision in a way 
likely to be understood by the police officer,81 and the prosecutor as-
signed to the case rarely assumes it to be his duty to inform the police 
department of the meaning of the decision or of its intended impact 
upon current police practice. The individual officer whose case has 
been lost is not expected to report the reason for the decision to his 
superiors. Some decisions, usually those the officer believes to be 
particularly outrageous, may be passed on to other officers by word of 
mouth, but they often become distorted in the retelling. If a "court 
officer" is assigned to the court by the police department, his respon-
sibilities do not include reporting the judge's rulings on police con-
duct. Obviously, police can not be affirmatively influenced to change 
their methods of law enforcement by the exclusion of evidence when 
there is no communication to them of why the decision was made. 
Inconsistency in trial court rulings further complicates the situa-
tion. For one thing, there is often a substantial disparity in the 
standards applied by the various judges of a multi-judge court. Once 
an officer learns of the conflicting attitudes of these judges, his accept-
ance of the court's role as supervisor of police practices is lessened; he 
is likely to conclude that whether evidence will be excluded in a 
given case depends in large part upon the ability of defense counsel 
to maneuver the case before a judge who will rule in his favor. The 
decisions of a single judge also may vary, depending upon the nature 
of the crime involved. "What is 'reasonable' to a judge in a narcotics 
80. Thus the police sometimes indicate that their complaint is not addressed to the 
higher courts, but only to the local courts: "The police can also live with the exclu-
sionary rule as applied by the higher courts of our states. The shoe begins to pinch 
in the lower courts, however, where frequently evidence is suppressed and defendants 
set free on grounds that I feel would not be sustained in our higher courts." Wilson, 
Police Authority in a Free Society, 54 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 175, 177 (1963). 
81. The Chicago Crime Commission plans to introduce legislation requiring "that 
whenever a judge rules on a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that it was 
illegally seized, he shall file written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support 
of his order." CHICAGO CRIME COMMISSION, A TWELVE-POINT LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR 
ILLINOIS 17 (1964). 
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case is not 'reasonable' to the same judge in a gambling case."82 
There are a number of reasons why this occurs, including the fact 
that the judge may in this way prevent conviction of a defendant 
he believes should not be treated as a criminal. 83 Even assuming that 
there are sometimes valid reasons for this result, its accomplishment 
by suppression of evidence further debilitates the exclusionary doc-
trine as a means of enhancing the quality of future police 
performance. 84 
C. Inadequate Communication Between 
Appellate Courts and the Police 
Communication between police and appellate courts is also less 
than adequate and occurs on a haphazard basis. Because appellate 
courts typically hear only those cases in which police practice is 
challenged on a fairly narrow set of facts, the picture presented to 
them is somewhat distorted. Appellate counsel fail to compensate for 
this by putting the individual case in the context of the overall en-
forcement policy involved. Instead, argument is commonly confined 
to an analysis of prior appellate decisions. Counsel for the state 
usually prepares the appeal without any consultation with the police 
for purposes of learning what significance the practice has for 
them.85 As a consequence, the court, which cannot itself gather the 
82. Remarks of Kings County, N.Y., District Attorney Silver, in 1962 PROCEEDINGS, 
A.B.A. SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW 26-27 (1963). 
83. The judge may hesitate to accomplish the same result by simply declaring the 
guilty defendant not guilty. Indeed, it is not clear whether it is a proper function 
of a trial judge to acquit the guilty when there is sufficient admissible evidence of 
guilt. Although case law on this point is generally lacking, see State v. Evjue, 254 
Wis. 581, 37 N.W .2d 50 (1949). 
84. A third form of inconsistency has been mentioned earlier in this article: 
inconsistency between before-the-fact and after-the-fact supervision. As noted earlier, 
it results in still greater confusion as to the governing norms and also raises doubts 
in the minds of the police as to whether the objective of the judges is to prevent 
illegal police action or simply to free the guilty. 
85. For example, a few years ago the Supreme Court of Illinois had before it a 
case which involved the right of a Chicago police officer to stop and question a person 
found in an alley under suspicious circumstances. The case raised a very vital question 
concerning the propriety of what the police usually refer to as "field interrogation," 
a common and significant practice in Chicago and elsewhere. Prior Illinois case law 
on the right to stop and question was fairly ambiguous, being limited to fact situa-
tions where the police put questions to persons sitting in parked cars. People v. 
Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943); People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 
649 (1937). Despite the importance of the issue to the Chicago police, no one in the 
department was consulted on the appeal or even knew that the case was being ap-
pealed. Thus it was not made apparent to the appellate court that the case put into 
question the entire "field interrogation" policy. The result was that the court faced 
the stopping and questioning issue only indirectly, leaving the policy still somewhat 
up in the air. People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill. 2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1961). 
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needed information, 86 must make judgments about current practices 
and about the significance of these practices upon inadequate data.87 
It also means that the court must make a decision intended to have a 
prospective effect upon police policy and practice without having a 
thorough familiarity with the policy and practice it intends to affect. 
Finally, the failure to involve the police at this stage means that they 
are not induced to discuss or rethink the policy challenged on appeal. 
The communication in the other direction-appellate courts to 
the police-is likewise unsatisfactory. Training materials become 
outdated, and officers who have completed their training often are 
not kept up to date on legal developments relevant to their work; 
some departments make no effort to disseminate such information to 
personnel at the operational level. 88 Even when appellate opinions 
are made available to the police, it is evident that they are not 
written in a way which makes it easy for the police to understand 
what they are expected to do. For example, the holding in the recent, 
important case of Escobedo v. Illinois89 reads: 
"We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no 
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun 
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into 
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations 
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect 
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with 
his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of 
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused 
has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' ... and that no state-
ment elicited by the police during the interrogation may be 
used against him at a criminal trial."90 
86. Professor Hurst, in his excellent study of the development of legal institutions 
in this country, points out: "As fact finders courts were inherently hampered by the 
limiting tradition of their office. It was not the proper work of judges to initiate broad 
solutions of public problems. The courts inherited no staff which they could use for 
independent fact finding. They had no independent funds with which to finance 
inquiries." HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAw 412 (1950). 
87. Indicative of this is the fact that it is common for appellate courts even today 
to cite the Wickersham Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (National Com-
mission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report No. 11, 1931) in regard to the 
treatment of persons in custody and for the proposition that abuses can be prevented 
only if persons arrested are taken immediately before a magistrate. This report is 
over thirty years old and was itself primarily based upon appellate decisions and 
newspaper accounts. Thus reliance upon this report for information as to current 
practice is based on the doubtful assumption that the appellate opinions were reliable 
evidence of current practice. Perhaps appellate opinions do give an indication of the 
kinds of police abuses which do occur, but this does not mean that they constitute 
an adequate basis for assessing the legitimate needs of law enforcement. 
88. For example, in one large police department it was the practice until a few 
years ago for a clerk in the commissioner's office promptly to file away appellate 
opinions sent to the police department by the county prosecutor. 
89. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
90. Id. at 490-91. 
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The opinion does not say that the police cannot interrogate at all; 
it does not say that suspects must be warned of their rights; it does 
not say that all suspects must be allowed to consult counsel upon 
request. 
Lawyers, of course, will recognize the quoted language as an 
effort to limit the scope of the decision to the particular facts, and 
many would undoubtedly applaud the Court for moving with cau-
tion in this new and sensitive area. Yet, the consequence is that, 
while the police know that a voluntary confession may be suppressed, 
they have little basis for translating the requirements of Escobedo 
into a revised interrogation practice which will be both effective and 
in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution. 
The translation of appellate cases into operating police practice 
is handicapped by the fact that most police agencies do not have 
effective legal counsel available to them. Prosecuting attorneys sel-
dom make a systematic effort to act as legal advisers to police depart-
ments within their jurisdiction. Most of them, for example, would 
not think it their responsibility to translate Escobedo into a specific 
statement of appropriate interrogation policy. Even the largest police 
departments are usually without competent legally-trained personnel 
on their staff, and, when a request for such personnel is made, it 
will likely be denied on the ground that the corporation counsel 
furnish the needed service.111 In point of fact, however, the corpora-
tion counsel typically respond only when a specific question is 
asked, is generally removed from the problems of criminal justice, 
and do not conceive of their responsibility as including participation 
in the development of proper law enforcement policies for police. 
D. Inherent Limitations Upon the Effect of a Negative Sanction 
Even when police do understand the requirements of law, the 
exclusionary rule does not always induce conformity with those re-
quirements. As Professor Barrett has pointed out, the exclusionary 
rule "comes into play only when a successful police search has turned 
up evidence which is to be offered at the trial .... In short, the rule 
has a deterrent impact only on illegal searches and those illegal 
arrests to which searches are incident.112 And it has impact on those 
91. This occurred recently in Chicago. 
92. Apparently, this continues-to be the case, although it can be argued that the 
Supreme Court in Wong Sun has also required the suppression of confessions because 
of illegal arrest. The reasoning of the opinion is far from clear. The Court first 
indicates it is handling the case as it would a search case because "the policies under-
lying the exclusionary rule [do not] invite any logical distinction between physical 
and verbal evidence," but then goes on to say that the oppressive circumstances present 
April 1965] The Judge's Role in Police Decisions 1009 
procedures only in those situations in which the police are proceed-
ing with the conscious purpose of securing evidence to use in pros-
ecuting the defendant."93 
The exclusionary rule does not itself prohibit improper police 
conduct; it only makes unlikely the conviction of the person against 
whom such conduct is directed. Obviously, such a rule can have an 
impact only in those cases in which the police desire a conviction, 
which is not true with regard to many offenses today. Most illustra-
tive are the gambling crimes, at least those involving persons other 
than the "higher-ups" in the "syndicate." Police in many parts 
of the country have concluded that meaningful conviction of the 
ordinary commercial gambler, such as the numbers runner or bookie, 
is impossible. 
Many trial judges are unwilling to convict in minor gambling 
cases, notwithstanding adequate admissible evidence to support a 
conviction.94 When a conviction is obtained, the penalty imposed is 
make it "unreasonable to infer that Toy"s response was sufficiently an act of free 
will •••• " Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). 
Most courts have given Wong Sun a very limited interpretation. Rogers v. United 
States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1964); Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th 
Cir. 1963); United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1963); Mefford v. State, 
235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964); State v. Lavallee, 104 N.H. 443, 189 A.2d 475 (1963); 
State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964), are all cases refusing to apply Wong 
Sun to statements obtained later at the police station. Contra, United States v. Sims, 
231 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1964); People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 196 N.E.2d 261 
(1963); State v. Mercurio, 194 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1963). 
Other limitations on the exclusionary rule likewise tend to narrow the number 
of cases in which the threat of exclusion is effective. Illustrative is the rule on 
standing. The leading case on standing is Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), 
in which the Court, after clarifying some aspects of the standing doctrine, then went 
on (in what might be characterized as strong dictum) to state the rule's apparent 
outer boundaries in these terms: "In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an 
unlawful search and seizure'. one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one 
against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice 
only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure 
directed at someone else." Id. at 261. 
More in keeping with the objectives of the exclusionary rule as set forth in Mapp 
is the unique California position announced in People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 
P.2d 855 (1955), allowing defendants to raise the question of illegal search of other 
parties when the evidence obtained thereby is offered against them. 
The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is further impaired by the common 
holding that exclusion is not required when the state brings a civil forfeiture action 
against the offender. Illustrative of many cases taking this view is Commonwealth 
v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964). The Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Constitution requires 
application of the exclusionary rule in such proceedings. 85 Sup. Ct. 323 (1964). 
93. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and Fourth Amendment, in SUPREME 
COURT REvmw 46, 54-55 (Kurland ed. 1960). 
94. Illustrative is the reported comment of one trial judge when the keeper and 
six patrons of a gambling house were brought before him: "Since there is wide-open 
gambling at race tracks, I don't see why this court should convict anyone of gambling. 
The persons arrested in this raid have broken the law by gambling and now I will 
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often a small fine, which the police view as hardly commensurate 
with the seriousness of the conduct or the amount of police resources 
expended to bring about the conviction.95 Moreover, the police 
may conclude that under existing search law it is impossible to ob-
tain evidence against certain offenders by lawful means. For example, 
when police are prohibited from entering premises without prior 
notice and request for admission, as is true in most jurisdictions,00 
they are likely to conclude that the wireroom bookie cannot be con-
victed. The only evidence typically available against him is his bet 
records, and he is ready to destroy them upon a moment's notice.97 
Despite the current difficulty in convicting ordinary gamblers, 
public and institutional pressures for police action continue. The 
result often is a program of searches and arrests without any thought 
of prosecution or conviction. Such a program serves some purposes 
which police may feel are advantageous to law enforcement: 
offenders are subjected to at least a brief period of incarceration; 
they must spend money to gain their release or to terminate the pro-
ceedings;98 any gambling paraphernalia or gambling funds will be 
seized;99 there are costs attendant upon the interruption and reloca-
tion of the criminal operation;100 and certain property used in the 
illegal business may be subjected to forteiture.101 Where these results 
break the law by discharging them.'' Wilson, How the Police Chief Sees It, Harpers 
Magazine, April 1964, pp. 140, 142. 
95. For the view of one police official on this score, see Wilson, supra note 94, at 
144. 
96. For citation to the s~ate statutes in point, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 
50 n.4 (1963) (dissenting opinion). 
97. It is common practice for the bookie to keep at hand a metal waste basket or 
similar container and a supply of lighter fluid or other flammable liquid. It does 
not take long, after the police announce their presence, to burn the records beyond 
recognition. The more sophisticated bookie often uses flash paper, which goes up in 
smoke at the touch of a lighted cigarette, or gelatin paper, which dissolves upon 
contact with water. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1964, p. 1, col. 8, and p. 49, cols. 1-3; 
Chicago Sun-Times, June 6, 1964, p. 1, cols. 2-8. 
98. Included are the bondsman's fee and the fee for the attorney who will obtain 
the individual's release on habeas corpus or will appear to insure suppression of the 
evidence before trial. 
99. If the individual sues for return of his money, the state is not barred by a 
prior acquittal in a criminal action from proving the money is connected with 
gambling, and in this civil proceeding the exclusionary rule is not applied to prevent 
proof of the connection. E.g., Dufauchard v. Ward, 51 Ill. App. 2d 42, 200 N.E.2d 833 
(1964); Martucci v. Detroit Comm'r of Police, 322 Mich. 270, 33 N.W.2d 789 (1948). 
100. The bookie will have to relocate his wireroom, and the policy or numbers 
syndicate operators will have to move their "office." Also, the bookie, if he has a small, 
select clientele, may deem it advisable to pay off all of his customers who claim they 
had placed winning bets with him. 
101. Most common, in states where the statutes so provide, is forfeiture of auto-
mobiles used to carry gambling paraphernalia. As noted earlier, the exclusionary rule 
is usually thought not to be applicable in these proceedings. See note 92 supra. 
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have replaced conviction as an objective of police action, it is not 
unusual for the police to become even less selective in deciding 
whom to arrest or search. 
IV. TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL 
Appellate court insistence both on maximum judicial participa• 
tion in the decision to issue process and on the exclusionary rule is 
aimed at preventing unconstitutional arrests and searches. Judicial 
review of law enforcement decisions is also premised upon preven-
tion. In current practice, however, none of these three techniques 
for control of the police has been implemented in a completely 
meaningful manner. As a consequence, the goal of prevention is not 
being achieved. 
If maximum judicial participation in the making of law enforce-
ment decisions is desirable, new ways must be developed to insure 
that it is meaningful. Steps must be taken to insure the availability 
of sufficient judicial manpower, and ways must be devised to over-
come the present disinterest of judges in performing these kinds 
of tasks. The alternative is to abandon the ideal of actual judicial 
participation in most of the important law enforcement decisions 
and to structure the system in a way which will give primary respon-
sibility for these decisions to the police or prosecutor. 
To suggest this alternative is not to say that judicial responsi-
bility for insuring fairness in the law enforcement process should 
likewise be abandoned. Perhaps this responsibility can better be dis-
charged if the judge is not viewed as a direct participant in the mak-
ing of law enforcement decisions, but instead is seen as the person 
responsible for review of the policies, as is generally the courts' rela-
tionship with other administrative agencies. This might provide a 
more significant judicial control over law enforcement decisions, 
particularly if courts were systematically to require police to artic-
ulate their enforcement policy and practice relevant to the issue in 
the individual case. Both courts and police would thus be forced to 
consider the propriety of the general policies applicable in a partic-
ular case, instead of merely considering individual situations on an 
ad hoc basis. 
The situation is much the same as to the ideal of prompt judicial 
review of all arrest decisions. If other than clerical or prosecutorial 
functions are to be served by the issuance of an arrest warrant after 
arrest, additional means of bringing this about must be found. 
Again, the choice is between somehow inducing judges to exercise 
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responsible review on a case-by-case basis or else expressly assigning 
the task to some other agency. 
As for the exclusionary rule, its limited impact is attributable 
in large measure to inadequate communication between the police 
and the courts. On the one hand, it is necessary that courts gain a 
better understanding of the factual bases of police action and of the 
underlying policies being furthered by such action. On the other 
hand, police must be more effectively informed as to what must be 
done to avoid exclusion. 
The fact that the exclusionary rule sometimes brings about cer-
tain unanticipated and undesired consequences does not mean that 
it is undesirable, but it does mean that the rule is not itself adequate 
to induce police to comply with the requirements of law. This is 
particularly true in the case of arrests and searches involving such 
offenses as gambling, where conviction is difficult and the conse-
quences of conviction are relatively meaningless from a law enforce-
ment point of view. Perhaps what is needed is a basic reappraisal of 
the kinds of substantive responsibilities police ought to be given. 
Certainly there needs to be an awareness that negative sanctions are 
not sufficient. Inducing police to develop methods of constructive 
compliance with the requirements of law requires more than judicial 
threats. It requires that proper and lawful methods be identified and 
communicated effectively to the police and that the criminal justice 
process be made as meaningful as possible, not only for defendants 
but also for agencies whose task it is to help administer the process. 
